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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 ► There remains significant uncertainty over what Britain’s exit from the EU means 
for alcohol policy
 ► Thus far public health groups have made proposals in four broad policy areas to 
protect health following Brexit:
 ► Explicit protection for public health in future Trade and Investment Agreements 
(TIAs) to ensure industry cannot legally challenge regulations
 ► Rationalisation of the duty system to ensure stronger products are taxed at a 
higher rate
 ► Labelling requirements for products to display nutritional information and health 
warnings
 ► Stronger restrictions on marketing 
 ► By contrast, alcohol industry groups’ demands are more detailed and numerous:
 ► Many of these seek to maintain the status quo and minimise disruption the industry; 
as such they do not have clear public health implications
 ► Others are more ambiguous as to their consequences, such as calls to lower tax 
on lower strength products and efforts to maintain current free trade guarantees, 
and so require careful scrutiny
 ► However, there are three areas where the industry agenda is particularly alarming, 
and ought to be resisted by public health groups:
 ► Attempts to encourage tax competition and to weaken regulation (including 
labelling requirements) by including them among non-tariff barriers to trade
 ► Attempts to increase industry influence over policy through participation in trade 
discussions, and developing ‘model agreements’ for the government to adopt 
wholesale
 ► Attempts to increase access to emerging markets with the greatest prospects for 
aggressive growth
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INTRODUCTION
On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union. On 29 March 2017, the British 
Government triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, setting the deadline for all existing 
agreements with the EU to expire for March 2019. More than a year on, there continues 
to be substantial uncertainty over the UK’s future relationship not only with the EU, but 
with much of the rest of the world. According to the Financial Times, there are at least 759 
treaties with 168 countries that the UK needs in principle to renegotiate in order to maintain 
the status quo.1 That is before we consider any new agreements like those proposed with 
countries such as the USA, Canada, India and China. The consequence is that there is the 
potential for substantial change in almost every domain of policy, and alcohol policy is no 
exception. 
Even prior to Brexit, there were concerns about the impact on public health of a ‘new 
generation’ of Trade and Investment Agreements, focused on reducing ‘non-tariff’ barriers to 
trade.2 These have been exacerbated by the prospect of several such new agreements in 
the wake of Britain’s exit from the EU. 
The purpose of this document is to summarise the objectives and priorities for public health 
organisations and the alcohol industry as the UK government negotiates this post-Brexit 
landscape. Some of these relate to the successor arrangements that will define the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU, others to new deals with other countries. However, between 
them we can begin to identify potential areas of conflict and disagreement, and so begin to 
map the outlines of major future debates. 
To understand the positions of different actors in alcohol policy, we analysed the websites, 
reports and other public statements of key organisations. On the alcohol industry side, we 
studied the leading UK trade associations: the British Beer and Pub Association (BBPA), the 
Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) and the Wine and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA). On 
the public health side, we looked at key NGOs and professional organisations, including the 
Faculty of Public Health, the King’s Fund, the Royal Society for Public Health, the UK Health 
Forum and the UK Public Health Network.
We start by laying out the major concerns expressed by public health organisations regarding 
the impact of Brexit and future UK trade negotiations on alcohol policy. We then describe 
the main priorities for industry trade associations. We conclude by identifying the key points 
of dispute that are likely to be most significant in the years to come. Brexit is the dominant 
political issue of this generation for the UK. This report goes some way to clarifying what is 
at stake for alcohol policy.
1    McClean, P. (2017), After Brexit: the UK will need to renegotiate at least 759 treaties, Financial Times (30 May). Available from: 
<https://www.ft.com/content/f1435a8e-372b-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
2    Kesley, J. (2012), New-generation free trade agreements threaten progressive tobacco and alcohol policies, Addiction 107:10, 
pp1719-21.
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WHAT DO PUBLIC HEALTH GROUPS WANT? 
Protection for public health in Trade and Investment 
Agreements
The biggest overarching demand from NGOs is that public health is explicitly protected in 
future Trade and Investment Agreements (TIAs). The UK Public Health Network notes that: 
“the broad nature of trade agreements leads to many public health measures 
being viewed as a contravention of those agreements. The complexity of the 
rules negotiated in trade agreements do not allow for easy legal interpretation. 
Combined with the fact that dispute resolution panels can impose extremely 
costly penalties, countries can be very cautious and self-censor.3 
This has two implications. The first is that it is very difficult to identify in advance the elements 
of a TIA that may turn out to present obstacles to public health regulations. The second is 
that even where governments may be within their rights to introduce regulations, they may 
be deterred by the costly legal challenges that TIAs make possible – referred to as the 
‘chilling effect’. For example, it has been suggested that the Australian Government was 
dissuaded from introducing compulsory warning labels about drinking in pregnancy by the 
potential trade law implications.4 The Scottish Government’s attempts to demonstrate that 
minimum unit pricing for alcohol represents a legitimate impediment to trade within the EU 
has delayed the implementation of the policy by six years and cost over £0.5 million in 
legal fees.5
One response is to seek a ‘carve out’ for specific products. The UK Public Health Network 
points out that: ‘Legal experts in international trade suggest that the “strongest options for 
states to safeguard their autonomy to implement tobacco control measures are to exclude 
such measures either from the scope of the relevant TIA [Trade and Investment Agreement] 
entirely”’.6 On this basis, they call on the government to “Consider excluding alcoholic 
beverages, policies and regulations, including any investment and services related to 
alcohol marketing or promotion, from TIAs as being inappropriate to a trade treaty designed 
to improve the health of nation”.7
In other words, the safest way to avoid the ambiguity and chilling effect of TIAs on alcohol 
regulation is to leave alcohol and other unhealthy commodities out of them entirely or to 
deliberately and explicitly restrict the alcohol industry’s ability to legally challenge public 
health measures. The European Public Health Association has called for such a ‘public 
health carve out’ from future agreements.8 
3    Lodge, H. (2017), A public health guide to trade and investment agreements: Aesclepius meets Mercury. UK Public Health 
Network, p21.
4    Lodge, op. cit., p36.
5    Scottish Government (2017), Legal challenge to Minimum Alcohol Pricing: FOI release. Available from: <https://beta.gov.scot/
publications/foi-17-02801/>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
6    Lodge, op. cit., p36.
7    Lodge, op. cit., p7.
8    Massay-Kosubek, Z. (2016), #TTIPLeaks and Bridging the gap between trade and public health, EPHA (1 June). Available from: 
https://epha.org/ttipleaks-and-bridging-the-gap-between-trade-and-public-health/>. [Accessed 17 April 2018] 
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However, this approach is controversial. A ‘carve out’ was achieved for tobacco in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement,9 but was criticised for being too narrow and neglecting 
other public health issues.10 Moreover, unless they are very extensive, carve outs can 
leave gaps. For example, the exemption of tobacco from the TPP meant only that tobacco 
producers could not directly challenge tobacco control regulations, but did nothing to prevent 
governments petitioning on their behalf. It applied only to manufactured tobacco products, 
not leaf tobacco. Certain TPP provisions, such as protections of trademarks could still be 
used to obstruct policies on labelling.11 Consequently, it may be challenging to formulate an 
effective carve out. 
Nevertheless, it is still a worthwhile project to seek to ensure special recognition and 
safeguards for public health from TIAs. One step in this direction is the proposed ‘Do No 
Harm’ amendment to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, which commits the government to give priority 
to public health, and is therefore seen by the peers proposing it as providing ‘clarity and 
reassurance on the tone and guiding principles for the UK’s Brexit negotiations across the 
board, including our future negotiations with the EU and around the world”.12
Stronger exemptions for alcohol and unhealthy commodities would be a dramatic step for 
the government to take. They would represent a major break from the status quo in the 
European Single Market, and as a result could potentially impede the access of British 
alcohol producers to European customers. Given the Government’s stated desire to promote 
alcohol exports to new markets, and with scotch whisky exports accounting for £4.4 billion 
last year, alcohol is likely to be central to new TIAs too.13 All in all, the prospect of alcohol or 
other public health carve outs appears fairly remote.
Tax
EU Directive 92/83/EEC requires all EU Member States to tax beer and spirits according to 
their alcohol content, but wine and cider according to their volume. This has the perverse 
effect of incentivising wine and cider producers to formulate drinks with a higher alcohol 
content, as this results in a lower rate of duty per unit of alcohol. 
A number of public health groups have called for the Government to take advantage of 
Brexit to rationalise the alcohol duty system. In the first instance, this would require the 
government to retain the power to set its own duty structure, which may come under the 
purview of future TIAs. The Alcohol Health Alliance has proposed that this power be used to 
‘ensure that wine and cider duties are set proportional to alcohol content, rather 
9    Freeman, B. (2015), Tobacco Carve-Out in TPP, Tobacco Control Blog (October 6). Available from: < http://blogs.bmj.com/
tc/2015/10/06/tobacco-carve-out-in-tpp/>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
10    Hawkins, B. et al (2016), Reassessing policy paradigms: a comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries, Global Public 
Health 13:1, pp1-19.
11    Hirono, K. et al (2016), To what extent does a tobacco carve-out protect public health in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement?, Public Health Research & Practice 26:2: e2621622.
12    Lord Hunt et al (2018), Peers lodge cross-party ‘Do No harm’ amendment to key Brexit bill, Politics Home (26 February). Available 
from: <https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/foreign-affairs/brexit/house/house-magazine/93135/peers-lodge-cross-party-
%E2%80%98do-no-harm%E2%80%99>. [Accessed 17 April 2018].
13    BBC News (2018), Scotch whisky exports hit record high. Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-
business-43009106>. [Accessed 9 March 2018]; SWA (2017), UK Government bids to unlock new markets for Scotch Whisky. 
Available from: < http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/news-publications/news/uk-government-bids-to-unlock-new-markets-for-scotch-
whisky/#.WoWjRqhl9PY>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
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than volume, to ensure stronger drinks attract higher tax’,14 a suggestion echoed by the UK 
Health Forum.15 
In principle, the Government ought to be amenable to this suggestion. In 2016, the then 
Health Minister Lord Prior claimed that: ‘The UK Government believes alcohol duties should 
be directly proportional to alcohol, as is the case with beer’.16 However, it remains to be seen 
whether it prioritises the reform of alcohol tax as an issue in future trade negotiations. 
Labelling
The single policy issue raised most by public health groups in the context of Brexit is probably 
labelling. Alcohol is currently exempt from the EU’s Food Information Regulation, and so 
unlike food and other beverages, there is no legal requirement for drinks producers to list 
ingredients, calorie and nutritional information on their products. Moreover, as noted above, 
mandatory health information, such as pregnancy warnings, may be seen as an impediment 
to trade within the EU. For example, in the case of food, the UK government was blocked 
from introducing ‘traffic lights’ on labels reflecting nutritional content.17 
At present, many UK alcohol companies voluntarily display limited health information and 
unit alcohol content. However, many products do not comply with industry-led schemes and 
over half of labels fall short of best practice in terms of font size and legibility.18 Moreover, 
since 2016, the vast majority of products have failed to display the revised chief medical 
officers’ drinking guidelines.19
The Royal Society for Public Health have argued that ‘Brexit provides an opportunity for 
the UK to go further, faster in providing comprehensive health information on labels’.20 They 
suggest that on the front label, alcohol containers should display their alcoholic strength 
(ABV), alcohol units (as a proportion of the chief medical officers’ weekly guidelines), calorie 
content as well as warnings about the risks of drink-driving and drinking during pregnancy. 
On the back label, they call for information on the drinking guidelines, including warnings 
about the link between alcohol and health conditions such as cancer.21
Equally, there is a risk that new TIAs may be formulated in a way that undermines such 
efforts to strengthen labelling requirements. For example, the World Trade Organization 
blocked Thailand’s government from introducing health warnings with graphic images on 
alcohol labels.22 
14    Alcohol Health Alliance (2017), Our policy position on alcohol taxation. Available from: < http://ahauk.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/AHA-Budget-2017-submission.pdf>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
15    UK Health Forum (2017), Using Brexit to tackle Non-Communicable Diseases and Improve the Health of the Public.
16    Lord Prior of Brampton (2016), Letter to Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, 6 June. Available from: < http://data.parliament.uk/
DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2016-0511/06062016_Letter_to_Lord_Brooke_of_Alverthorpe_Alcohol_Oral_PQ.PDF>. [Accessed 15 
February 2018].
17    UK Health Forum (2017), op. cit., p8.
18    Institute of Alcohol Studies (2015), Dead on Arrival? Evaluating the Public Health Responsibility Deal for Alcohol. London: Institute 
of Alcohol Studies, p6-7.
19    Alcohol Health Alliance (2017), Right to Know: Are alcohol labels giving consumers the information they need?.
20    Royal Society for Public Health (2017), General Election 2017: RSPH sets out manifesto to improve and protect the public’s 
health. Available from: <https://www.rsph.org.uk/about-us/news/general-election-2017-rsph-sets-out-manifesto-to-improve-and-
protect-the-public-s-health.html>. [Accessed 15 February 2018].
21    Royal Society for Public Health (2018), Labelling the Point: Towards better alcohol health information. London: Royal Society for 
Public Health.
22    O’Brien, P. (2013), Australia’s double standard on Thailand’s alcohol warning labels, Drug & Alcohol Review 32:1, pp5-10. 
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Marketing
Marketing is another policy area of close interest to public health groups following Brexit. 
Many of them endorse restrictions on alcohol marketing, such as banning sponsorship, 
regulating the content of advertisements and limiting the exposure of children to marketing 
materials.23 Yet the UK Public Health Network observe that interpretations of trade law can 
be unclear as to whether such measures are permissible. For example, France’s restrictions 
on alcohol advertising (banning sponsorship and television advertising and limiting content 
to factual details about the product) have been deemed consistent with EU law. However, the 
Swedish Government was required to reverse a ban on advertising in the printed media.24 
The consequences of Brexit for alcohol marketing regulation are therefore unclear. It has 
the potential to reduce some of the legal ambiguity around restrictions on alcohol marketing, 
and present the British Government with the opportunity to introduce stronger restrictions. 
At the same time, new and successor trade agreements could close this window, and further 
protect advertisers. 
23    Anderson, W. (ed) (2013), Health First: an evidence-based alcohol strategy for the UK. Stirling: University of Stirling, 24-7.
24    Lodge, op. cit. p36.
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WHAT DOES THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY WANT? 
Alcohol industry groups have been more detailed and wide ranging in their stated objectives 
for Brexit, between them producing a long list of proposals. These can be classified into 
three categories: proposals that aim primarily to maintain the status quo, policy areas with 
greater ambiguity that ought to be watched carefully and clear threats to public health.
Proposals to maintain the status quo 
A number of alcohol trade associations’ favoured policies seek to minimise disruption 
following Britain’s exit from the EU. Most of these do not appear to affect the government’s 
ability to regulate alcohol in the interests of health (though as noted above, the chilling effect 
of particular trade regulations is not always evident in advance). 
In common with many other UK businesses, the alcohol industry is highly concerned to 
ensure it has access to sufficient trained labour. This is a particularly prominent issue for 
the BBPA, given the high proportion of EU workers in pubs. Consequently, it has called for 
the government to protect the residence rights of foreign employees already in the UK25, to 
avoid weakening employment rights and to implement a ‘skills agenda’ to help recruit UK 
workers to the hospitality sector.26 
A second theme of the industry’s policy agenda is the desire to limit the bureaucratic impact 
of leaving the EU. The BBPA and WSTA have both called for the retention of the Excise 
Movement and Control System, the EU-wide digital tracking system for goods subject to 
excise duty.27 Insofar as these maintain the status quo, such systems do not have obvious 
implications for public health.
A third issue is the protection of certain product names and geographical designations. For 
example, the Scotch Whisky Association has focused much of its attention on securing legal 
protection for the Geographical Indication ‘scotch whisky’, ensuring that only authentic and 
authorised products can be marketed using that phrase.28 On the other hand, the WSTA has 
called for the relaxation of some standards, which it says restrict innovation. For example, 
the EU recognises sloe gin as a distinct product from other gins, but not other products such 
as damson gin.29 Again, there is no obvious role for public health in these debates. 
Areas of potential concern
A second category of industry Brexit demands relates to policies which are not necessarily 
harmful to public health (and may in some cases be beneficial), but which nonetheless carry 
25    BBPA (2017), Brexit negotiations – BBPA backs focus on transitional measures and wider priorities set out by UK industry. 
Available from: < http://www.beerandpub.com/news/brexit-negotiations-bbpa-backs-focus-on-transitional-measures-and-wider-
priorities-set-out-by-uk-industry>. [Accessed 19 February 2018].
26    BBPA (2017), 2017 General Election Beer and Pub Manifesto. Available from: < http://s3.amazonaws.com/bbpa-prod/
attachments/documents/uploads/24599/original/BBPA_Election%20manifesto_v3_WEB.pdf?1493975441>. [Accessed 19 
February 2018].
27    BBPA (2017), British Beer Export Strategy 2017-2022. Available from: <http://s3.amazonaws.com/bbpa-prod/attachments/
documents/resources/24825/original/Export%20Strategy%20FINAL.pdf?1510223628>. [Accessed 19 February 2018]. WSTA 
(2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry. Available from: <http://www.wsta.co.uk/publications-useful-
documents/121-brexit-policy-paper-the-road-ahead-for-the-wine-and-spirit-industry/file>. [Accessed 19 February 2018].
28    SWA (2017), Scotch Whisky and Brexit. Available from: <http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/news-publications/publications/
documents/scotch-whisky-and-brexit/#.WorlUhPFKi4>. [Accessed 19 February 2018].
29    WSTA (2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry, op. cit.
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SECTION 2: WHAT DOES THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY WANT?
the potential to cause harm. Consequently, these policy areas ought to be watched carefully 
by public health groups.
The first such area is alcohol duty. As described above, EU regulations create a perverse 
incentive for wine and cider producers to produce stronger drinks, as these attract lower 
tax per unit. Some industry groups appear to agree that this is undesirable. However, their 
focus has tended to be on lowering the price of lower strength drinks rather than raising 
the price of stronger products. It is possible that such measures may bring health benefits, 
if they encourage drinkers to switch down to lower strength products.30 On the other hand, 
it is possible that they may merely encourage people to drink more overall, and so may 
have a negative health impact.31 Peculiarly, it is the BBPA that has been the most vocal in 
pushing for changes to the tax system, calling for the lowest rate of beer duty to be applied 
to products below 3.5% – rather than 2.8% ABV as it is now – even though such a move is 
already consistent with EU law.32 
A second area of ambiguity relates to requests to maintain free trade guarantees already 
secured by the EU. The WSTA has emphasised the need to ensure tariff and quota free 
access to EU markets. It also points out that the EU has existing preferential trade agreements 
with most major wine producers, which will no longer apply once Britain leaves the EU.33 
Moreover, it is not only finished alcohol products that are vulnerable to trade restrictions, but 
ingredients in the production process such as malting barley and hops.34 
It is unclear how public health should respond to these questions. It is likely that restricting 
imports of alcohol or ingredients in the production process would raise prices. Then again, 
trade policy is a rather blunt and indirect way to regulate alcohol (compared to policies like 
raising alcohol tax and minimum unit pricing), with the potential for substantial unintended 
consequences. 
Major threats
Finally, we turn to the most alarming industry proposals from the perspective of public health, 
the ones that are likely to be most contentious and which require most scrutiny. These come 
under three broad headings: areas of direct policy conflict, efforts to insert the industry into 
the policy process and attempts to increase access to new markets. 
a. Areas of direct policy conflict
There are certain areas where public health groups and the alcohol industry propose directly 
contradictory policy proposals. Whereas public health groups urge higher alcohol duty 
to addres cheap alcohol, trade associations appear to be using Brexit to encourage ‘tax 
competition’ between the UK and other governments. For example, the BBPA’s election 
manifesto played on concerns about the UK’s trading relationship with the rest of the world 
30    Rehm, J. et al (2016), Evidence of reducing ethanol content in beverages to reduce harmful use of alcohol, Lancet 
Gastroenterology & Hepatology 1, pp78-83.
31    Vasiljevic, M. (2018), Marketing messages accompanying online selling of low/er and regular strength wine and beer products in 
the UK: a content analysis, BMC Public Health 18:147; Vasiljevic, M. et al (2018), Impact of lower strength alcohol labelling on 
consumption: A randomized controlled trial, Health Psychology. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000622 
32    BBPA (2017), BBPA responds to publication of Great Repeal Bill White Paper [Press Release]. Available from: <http://www.
beerandpub.com/news/bbpa-responds-to-publication-of-great-repeal-bill-white-paper> [Accessed 5 March 2018].
33    WSTA (2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry, op. cit.
34    Ibid. 
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SECTION 2: WHAT DOES THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY WANT?
to demand a ‘more competitive excise duty regime that supports growth in exports of 
British beer’.35
At the same time, industry groups have urged the government to reduce ‘non-tariff’ barriers 
to trade in ways that could limit its ability to regulate, for example, labelling. The WSTA 
has declared the EU regulatory framework for labelling (which, recall, does not require any 
disclosure of nutritional or health information) as ‘fit for purpose’ and called for it to be rolled 
over into UK law.36 It celebrates its previous successes in opposing ‘technical barriers’ to 
trade, ‘such as new standards of packaging and labelling’.37 The BBPA acknowledges that, 
because of WTO rules, tariffs are unlikely to be imposed on beer by most countries, and 
consequently their ‘greater concern’ is ‘the potential for non-tariff barriers (eg labels, product 
testing rules and local subsidies)’.38 
b. Increasing policy influence
Given the secrecy and ambiguity around trade agreements, public health groups should be 
attentive to the process by which they are reached as well as their content. The UK Public 
Health Network observes that:
Trade negotiations are conducted in secret and, despite attempts at clarification 
of issues by the WTO in its agreements, the process is still perceived as 
tantamount to “chasing a black cat in a dark room, blindfolded.” Texts of the 
proposals are rarely made available for public discussion and often shared 
only with industry-dominated trade advisory committees.39
As a result, participation in trade discussions carries substantial influence. For this reason, 
industry proposals for greater involvement in trade policy warrant scrutiny. The Scotch 
Whisky Association has suggested the establishment of a trade policy advisory network to 
facilitate a more ‘structured dialogue’ between government and industry, which they believe 
‘will become of critical importance as the UK enters into trade negotiations with the EU and 
then other countries’.40 
The WSTA has been bolder still. Alongside its counterparts in Australia and New Zealand, it 
has begun working on a ‘model trade agreement’, which it intends to submit to the government 
for ratification.41 In this way, the WSTA is seeking to exploit a lack of administrative capacity 
in the civil service to push its own agenda on trade: 
While the UK Government cannot formally enter into discussions with non-EU 
countries while still in the EU there is nothing stopping industry doing so, and 
the WSTA has already been active on this front... Such agreements can then be 
adopted by government, secure in the knowledge that the technical standards 
have been agreed by both importers and exporters.42
35    BBPA (2017), 2017 General Election Beer and Pub Manifesto, op. cit.
36    WSTA (2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry, op. cit.
37    WSTA, Facilitating Market Access. Available from: <http://www.wsta.co.uk/what-we-do/policy?id=554>. [Accessed 5 March 2018].
38    BBPA (2017), British Beer Export Strategy 2017-2022, op. cit.,p12.
39    Lodge, op. cit., p5.
40    SWA (2017), Scotch Whisky and Brexit, op. cit.
41    WSTA (2017), WSTA proposes industry to lead on model free-trade agreements at its Annual Conference. Available from: 
<http://www.wsta.co.uk/press/790-wsta-proposes-industry-to-lead-on-model-free-trade-agreements-at-its-annual-conference>. 
[Accessed 5 March 2018].
42    WSTA (2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry, op. cit.
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The WSTA has also called for the UK Government to join the World Wine Trade Group, an 
international alliance of wine producers, to increase industry influence on trade agreements.43 
A wider concern is that the alcohol industry could use trade as a ‘trojan horse’ to build 
relationships with policymakers and take a more prominent role in the policy process. 
This is of particular concern post-Brexit in light of the priority the government has given 
to encouraging alcohol exports (see below). The BBPA has called for support from the 
Department for International Trade, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
and the Foreign Office to help promote beer exports abroad.44 Similarly, the WSTA has used 
the opportunity to stress the need for ‘partnership working’ across government. It is seeking 
a ‘primary authority’ role, which would see it acting as a ‘one-stop shop for regulation’, 
carving out a formal position for itself as an intermediary between the government and 
individual businesses.45 
c. Access to foreign markets
Another area of major concern for health and development groups following Brexit should be 
industry attempts to use new trade deals to break into foreign markets. The prime example 
here is India – a country with high tariffs on alcohol to restrict the influence of multinational 
drinks producers. The SWA in particular is desperate to break down these barriers:
India is perennially the market with the greatest potential. It is already our 
third biggest export market by volume and our tenth by value, but Scotch only 
has a 1% share of the Indian spirits market which shows there is real scope 
to expand… Post-Brexit, we want to see an ambitious UK-India Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) that, at the very least, brought down the current 150% import 
tariff.46
India is just one of a number of countries on the SWA’s shortlist for free trade agreements, 
including China, Brazil, Thailand, Kenya, Nigeria and Myanmar. The BBPA has echoed this 
prioritisation of access to new markets, focusing particularly on India and China.47 
Even prior to Brexit, the UK government has been criticised for its role in supporting British 
alcohol producers in low and middle-income countries. For example, it has facilitated Diageo’s 
acquisitions in China and Ethiopia, lobbied state governments in India to loosen regulations 
on beer and used development aid to fund Diageo and SAB Miller to use local crops in 
their brewing processes in Cameroon and Sudan.48 This may be seen as inconsistent with 
recognition of the harm to health caused by alcohol – there appears an obvious disconnect 
between regulating alcohol companies at home and championing them abroad. Moreover, 
some have suggested that the limited governance capacity of many developing countries 
may leave them more vulnerable to political pressure from multinational drinks producers.49 
43    Ibid.
44    BBPA (2017), British Beer Export Strategy 2017-2022, op. cit. 
45    WSTA (2017), Brexit: The road ahead for the wine and spirit industry, op. cit.
46    SWA (2017), Scotch Whisky and Brexit, op. cit.
47    BBPA (2017), British Beer Export Strategy 2017-2022, op. cit.
48    Collin, J., Johnson, E. & Hill, S. (2014), Government support for alcohol industry: promoting exports, jeopardizing global 
health, BMJ 348:g3648.
49    Bakke, O. & Endal, D. (2010), Alcohol policies out of context: drinks industry supplanting government role in alcohol policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Addiction 105, pp. 22–8.
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Further, it is not only consumers in poorer trading partners that are at risk from Brexit. For 
example, the WSTA insists that a Free Trade Agreement with Canada should weaken state 
retail monopolies that appear to limit harmful drinking.50
Other unknowns
This report has sought to reflect the current contours of the debate around post-Brexit 
alcohol policy. However, it is worth noting that there are a number of additional issues which 
are likely to be affected by Brexit despite their lack of prominence in discussions so far. The 
ultimate resolution of questions around border control is likely to have a significant impact 
on smuggling and illicit alcohol. Alcohol-related crime will be influenced by the impact of 
Brexit on travel and tourism, as well as cross-border policing. The EU currently plays a role 
in funding alcohol research and health promotions campaigns, which may be jeopardised 
by Brexit. These are just a few examples, reflecting the wide-ranging impact of Brexit, well 
beyond the issues laid out here.
50    Stockwell, T. et al (2009), Changes in per capita alcohol sales during the partial privatization of British Columbia’s retail alcohol 
monopoly 2003-2008: a multi-level local area analysis, Addiction 104:11, pp1827-36.
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CONCLUSION
We are still early in the Brexit process, and much remains unclear. We do not know exactly 
which policies and institutions will be retained from the EU. We do not know which countries 
the UK will try to seek trade agreements with, and what these agreements will look like. 
However, based on the public statements of both industry and public health groups we can 
draw three emerging conclusions about the likely shape of the debate to come.
First, there are certain policy areas that are almost certain to cause contention. Most 
obviously, public health and industry have very different visions of how to use alcohol taxes 
after Brexit: whether to use it to raise the price of the strongest drinks, or to levy a more 
‘competitive’ reduced rate, particularly on lower strength products. Labelling is also likely 
to be a policy area to watch: the industry sees it as a restriction on trade, public health 
sees an opportunity to improve on limited EU regulation. Other issues such as advertising 
restrictions and tariffs may also gain prominence in the debate.
The second point to emerge is that the process of forming policy and trade agreements 
matters as well as the substance. The development of trade agreements is opaque, and the 
significance of particular provisions is often not immediately clear. As a result, the extent to 
which industry guides or shapes agreements – and the extent to which public health groups 
are excluded – may prove to be crucial. 
Finally, the consequences of Brexit go well beyond the UK. If Brexit acts as a spur for 
the government to support alcohol producers’ expansion into other (particularly developing) 
countries, and to assist them in undermining these countries’ regulations, the greatest health 
burden may be felt far from these shores.
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